1994]
Suits Against State Officials 425 of their counterparts under the federal Bill of Rights. 1O Therefore, a plaintiff wishing to sue a state official for a violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights would often gain no substantive advantage by filing the suit in a Maryland state court rather than in a federal court. 11 Differences do exist between Maryland and federal courts, however, in the extent of immunities from damages afforded defendants.12 These differences may give plaintiffs filing in Maryland state court a distinct advantage over those filing in federal court when bringing suit against a state official for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
In a number of rulings interpreting Section 1983 itself, as opposed to the constitutional rights it protects, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of this remedy. 13 The result of such rulings has been that in some cases, even if plaintiffs prove that government officials have violated their constitutional rights, they are left without a statutory remedy. 14 . Suits against state and local officials under Section 1983 are classified either as official capacity or· personal capacity suits. IS Of-[Vol. 23 ficial capacity suits are brought against government officials who are merely carrying out their duties under an unconstitutional statute or rule.
16 Damages in such suits are collected from the government treasuryY Official capacity suits are comparable to suits against the government itself. ls Damages may be assessed against local government officials acting in their official capacity, or against the local governments themselves.
19 No damages may be awarded, however, in suits against state officials acting in their official capacity. 20 Personal capacity suits are brought against government officials who exceed or abuse their authority under state or locallaw. 21 Under Section 1983, officials who exceed or abuse their authority under state or local law can be held personally liable for damages. 22 The damages are limited, however, by various immunities. 23 Some officials, such as judges, legislators, and prosecutors, enjoy absolute immunity from damages. 24 Most other officials and employees receive qualified, or limited, immunity from damages. 25 Officials with qualified immunity may be held liable only for actions which violated the "settled constitutional rights" of the plaintiff at the time of the action. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed. only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.
18. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. "[AI suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,471 (1985) . "As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. In sum, plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated by state officials have no remedy under federal law 27 in the following situations:
(1) When the violation was committed by a state official acting in an official capacity;28 (2) when the violation was committed by an official acting in a judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial capacity;29 or (3) when the violation was committed by any other official acting in an individual capacity, unless the right had previously been clearly defined by settled law. 30 Several opinions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, have indicated that the identical circumstances might lead to recovery in Maryland state courtS.31 Although there is no statutory counterpart to Section 1983 in Maryland, the court of appeals has recognized a common-law right of action for violations of certain sections of the Maryland Declaration of RightsY In suits for damages against individual government officials based on violations of constitutional rights, Maryland does not recognize a distinction between suits against officials in their individual versus their official capacities. 33 Damages may be awarded against the official personally in both instances. 34 Also, Maryland does not seem to recognize a qualified immunity for state officials. 35 These two differences between Maryland and federal law may make it possible for plaintiffs to recover in Maryland courts under some of the circumstances where recovery is not allowed under federal law. This Article will examine the scope of the Maryland rulings in suits against state officials and will compare the results under Maryland law with the results under federal law . It can then be determined in what instances these differences might lead plaintiffs to file suit in Maryland state court rather than federal court. This Article will further explore some questions left unanswered by the Maryland opinions, including: possible unfairness to individual defendants, the role of the State Tort Claims Act,36 the effect of the rulings on the 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 absolute immunity of certain officials, and the application of these principles in cases involving claims under both state and federal law.
II. FEDERAL LAW
In the 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape,37 the Supreme Court held that Section 1983 provided a damage remedy against members of the Chicago Police Department who had violated the plaintiffs'
. constitutional rights.38 In Monroe, thirteen police officers entered and ransacked a private home without a search warrant and detained the owner for ten hours without an arrest warrant. 39 The Court found that the defendants had acted "under color of" state law, despite the fact that their actions exceeded their official authority and, in fact, were in violation of state law. 40 The Court refused to impose a state of mind requirement that the defendants' acts be "wilfully" done, stating that Section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. "41 Despite this broad statement, it has not always been possible to hold government officials and governments responsible for the natural consequences of their actions. Plaintiffs injured by the unconstitutional acts of government officials have been left without damage remedies because the Supreme Court has placed a number of restrictions on Section 1983. 42 Some of these restrictions relate to suits against governmental entities themselves or, similarly, against governmental officers in their official capacity.43 A different set of restrictions apply when suit is brought against governmental officers in their individual capacity. 44 It is useful to discuss these two lines of decisions separately.
A. Ojjicial Capacity Suits
In Monroe v. Pape,45 the plaintiffs sued not only the thirteen Chicago police officers who had broken into their home, but also 49 Local governments can only be held liable when the government's "official policy" causes the violation. 50 Moreover, the governmental entity cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory for the action of its employees and non-policy-making officials. 51 Although there has been much litigation concerning what constitutes official government policy, the Court has continued to require that a violation be caused by official policy for recovery against municipal governments. 
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In Edelman v. Jordan,59 the plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment by suing the state officials responsible for carrying out state policy instead of the state itself. 60 Instead of administering the programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD) in accordance with federal regulations, the officials were following Illinois regulations which allowed the Department of Public Aid to delay paying AABD benefits longer than federal law permitted. 61 The plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling t.he defendants to turn over all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld. 62 Relief was not granted because the damages sought would be paid out of the state treasury, not the personal assets of the state officials. 63 The Court held that when the damages sought will be paid out of a state's treasury, suits against public officials are "official capacity" actions and are to be treated as actions against the state itself.64
Congress does have the power to waive the protections of the Eleventh Amendment when using its power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The Supreme Court has held, however, that such waivers must be explicit. 66 The 69 The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to state courts; therefore, suit was not barred on this ground. 70 Nevertheless, the Court held that neither a state, nor a state official acting in an official capacity, is considered a "person" for purposes of a Section 1983 damages action. 71 As with decisions under the Eleventh Amendment,. the distinction between official capacity suits for damages, which are not allowed, and individual capacity suits, which may be allowed in some circumstances, is whether the suit is in reality against the state or the individual, regardless of how it is characterized. 72
B. Individual Capacity Suits
When the constitutional violation is not caused by government policy, but by the actions of an individual official, the suit is considered a "personal-capacity action. "73 Defendants in such cases are usually accused of acting outside the scope of their authority or in violation of state law. Damage awards in such cases can be executed only against the official's personal assets, and not against the government. 74 All governmental officials, however, enjoy some form of immunity from damages in a Section 1983 action. (1982) . 81. This so called "objective" standard replaced an earlier subjective standard, which required the official to demonstrate a "good-faith belief" in the legality of his or her actions. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 248. The Court abandoned the subjective good faith standard for the objective one because they felt that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to ·the burdens of broad-reaching discovery" which would necessarily delve into their "subjective motivation." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. 82. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240. The Court has recognized that without at least qualified immunity the threat of liability would deter a public official from the "willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good." Id. Another rationale for the immunities is to avoid "the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion." Id. 83 
[d.
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievious [sic) and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be" granted. their official capacity are not subject to Section 1983 liability.107 The court of appeals, after an extensive review of the differences between official and individual capacity suits under Section 1983,108 reversed the dismissal on the grounds that the lower courts had applied the wrong standard and had incorrectly labeled an individual capacity suit as an official capacity suit. 109 As to the state constitutional claims, the trial court dismissed both claims, again relying on the distinction between official and individual capacity suits. The court held that this was an official capacity suit and therefore barred by sovereign immunity.11O The court of special appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, but again relied on the distinction between individual and official capacity suits. III The court of appeals held that state law does not allow bifurcation of claims into individual capacity and official capacity. I 12 All claims are treated as if they were against the official personally, and therefore the sovereign immunity defense to a federal Section 1983 claim is not allowed in a similar suit relying on Maryland law.
Compare
B. The Official Capacity Versus Individual Capacity Distinction
Similar to the federal government, the state itself is immune from suit for constitutional violations. l13 The doctrine of sovereign at 435. [I)t is clear that a suit against a government official in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the government entity. A victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity that employs him. Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action is asserted against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to a personalcapacity lawsuit and has no opportunity to present a defense. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985 
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B. State
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has reached a different conclusion for claims brought under the Maryland Constitution by refusing to recognize the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity suits. ISS As under federal law, claims against the state itself are barred, not by the Eleventh Amendment, but by the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity.ls6 Only the legislature can change this result, through legislation waiving the immunity.
Suits against individuals, however, are another matter. The court of appeals made clear that the state's sovereign immunity does not extend to any state officials who have injured one of the state's citizens through a constitutional violation. 1S7 "To do so would 'create a· privileged class, free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries threatened. "'158 This reasoning makes sense when applied to suits for individual actions in excess of an official's authority, for in that case it is his or her own wrongdoing which has caused the harm. It does not make sense, however, to hold a state official personally liable for merely carrying out or enforcing state law, when it is the law itself that causes the violation.
Holding the state official personally accountable for enforcing an unconstitutional state law could result in grave injustice in many cases. For example, it is hard to imagine that the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources would be personally responsible for millions of dollars in damages by implementing an unconstitutional state welfare statute. Yet there is no other way to read the Ritchie opinion. The court of appeals cites with approval the case of Wyler v. Gibson,.s9 "where the Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary was held personally liable for an encroachment on the plaintiffs' land caused by an expansion of the Penitentiary. The expansion of the Penitentiary was authorized by a statute which specified the areas of its expansion and authorized condemnation." 160 What is a state official supposed to do when confronted with a duty under state law to implement a possibly unconstitutional state statute? Technically, since federal law is supreme, the official should refuse to carry out the unconstitutional statute. Is it fair, however, to confront a state official with the choice of either ignoring state law and possibly losing his or her job, or, on the other hand, 161 Under federal law , an official cannot be held liable unless the constitutional right in question had been established at the time that the official took action. 162 Applying the Ritchie holding, an official could be held liable for implementing a state statute later held unconstitutional, even if the official had no reason to know of its unconstitutionality at the time that he or she took action.
If public officials are held liable in such situations, many people may be unwilling to serve in public positions. In fact, although the judgment would be entered against the individual official, it is inconceivable that the state would not indemnify an official who was held liable merely for carrying out an unconstitutional state statute. It would be extremely unfair for the state not to indemnify the official in such circumstances.
If it is the state, as it must be, and not the individual who will eventually pay in such circumstances, then the Ritchie opinion is nothing more than a sleight of hand. The court of appeals has, in effect, abolished state sovereign immunity from damages while avowing that only the legislature has the power to do SO.163 Actually, the reasoning of the Ritchie opinion is virtually identical with the reasoning of the federal case of Ex parte Young, 164 where the Supreme Court held that a suit against a state official is not in actuality a suit against the state. 165 The difference, albeit a large one in practical terms, is that the United States Supreme Court has limited this holding to suits for injunctive relief. 166 The Ritchie opinion also extends it to cases for damages. This is not to say that the court might not approve a large damages award against a state official for carrying out an unconstitutional state law, only that they have not yet actually done so. Clearly, by refusing to distinguish between individual and official capacity suits, the Ritchie court has set the stage for such awards. The court has decided, as a policy matter, that all persons harmed by unconstitutional state action should be entitled to compensation. This result is more equitable than the federal result of denying relief in such situations.
Unfairness would only result if the damage award in such cases were paid by the official personally. As discussed above, this will not' likely be the case, because of voluntary indemnification by the state. There is another reason why the official, at least in many cases, might not be personally liable for the judgement. As noted in a footnote in the Ritchie opinion, the state legislature, as part of the Maryland Tort Claims Act,184 has waived the state's immunity from. certain tort actions and allowed the state to be substituted for the state official, who is granted immunity,l85 Thus, any discussion of this issue must include an examination of the Torts Claim Act and its effect on the holding in Ritchie.
V. THE MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Application to State Ojjicials
The court in Ritchie mentions the Maryland Tort Claims Act (hereinafter the State Act) only in a footnote at the end of the opinion while reviewing its holding as to governmental and personal liability.186 The court first asserts that its conclusion-that the state is immune from unconstitutional acts and that the individual employee would be liable-could be changed by statute. The court then recognized that the Maryland legislature had done "precisely this, under certain circumstances, in the Maryland Tort Claims Act. "189 The State Act waives the sovereign immunity defense of the state and grants immunity to the individual official for "tort actions generally," 190 as long as the employee's actions were not malicious, grossly negligent, or outside the scope of employment. 191 The State Act, as amended in 1985, would encompass many constitutional claims. A 1989 bill that would have exempted state constitutional claims from the State Act did not pass. 192 The court remarked that the State Act did not apply to give immunity to the· individual defendant in Ritchie, because there had been allegations of malice. 193 The court did indicate, however, that if the plaintiff failed to prove malice at trial, the defendant might plead the statutory immunity at that time.
194
If the court's implication about the State Act is true, some of the unfairness of the results which would follow from application of the law as stated in the body of the opinion is corrected. State employees who were merely enforcing state law in good faith would not, in fact, be held personally liable for tortious injury caused by constitutional violations. But at the same time, injured plaintiffs in such cases would be allowed to recover from the state directly. State employees who acted maliciously would still be personally liable.
One must wonder why the court bothered to spend several pages of text laying out what the law would be in the absence of a statute, when a completely different result would be reached under the statute, which does, in fact, seem to apply in many cases. This is especially problematic since a plaintiff who followed the court's reasoning in Ritchie, and sued the individual rather than the state, might be left without any remedy if the official successfully claimed immunity under the statute. In such a case, it does not appear that the state could merely be substituted as a defendant after suit had been filed, Plaintiffs would be able to recover under the reasoning of the court's opinion l96 or under the State Act,197 but only if they followed the appropriate procedures for the appropriate type of case. In cases where the unconstitutional action was made by the official in good faith, within the scope of his or her duty, the proper defendant would be the state, and the notice provisions of the State Act would have to be followed. 198 In cases where the official acted in bad faith, or was grossly negligent, or acted outside the scope of employment, suit would be proper only against the individual. 199 In fact, in many cases, the only safe course for a plaintiff to follow would be to sue both the state and the individual, because it may be impossible to determine at the onset of the suit whether any of the exceptions to the State Act applied. For example, in Ritchie the plaintiff had alleged malice on the part of the individual defendant. 2°O As the court implied, however, if malice was not proved at trial, the defendant would be immune under the statute. 201 Unless the state had been included as a proper defendant at that time, it would be too late to add it. of insurance coverage" held by the state. 202 The amount of this waiver has been set by the state treasurer at $50,000 per claimant for each injury.203 At the same time, the immunity granted to the official by the State Act does not seem to have a similar monetary limit. Therefore, at least under the scheme of the State Act, it does appear that an injured plaintiff might go uncompensated for part of a large claim.
Given the Ritchie opinion, however, it is unclear whether such a result would be allowed by the court. This is because the court clarifies in Ritchie that absent a statutory provision, the official would be personally liable. 204 The purpose of this result is to avoid creating "'a privileged class, free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries threatened." '205 The Ritchie court indicates that it is up to the legislature to decide whether to waive the state's sovereign immunity. 206 The court also indicates that the individual liability recognized in Ritchie could be abolished by statute if the legislature substituted state for individual liability. 207 There is no discussion, however, of whether the legislature could grant the individual official immunity without the accompanying waiver of immunity so that an injured plaintiff could be compensated. It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals of Maryland would allow this result. On the one hand, to do so would create the same problem of leaving a plaintiff, who had been injured by the unconstitutional acts of a state official, uncompensated. On the other hand, there is no mention in the Ritchie opinion that the court's goal of compensating all such injured plaintiffs is itself constitutionally required. If it is not constitutionally required, then it might be subject to legislative control.
Furthermore, if the state could not grant individual immunity without substituting state liability, then it might not be able to have the individual's immunity exceed the state's waiver of immunity because of the same lack of compensation for constitutional injuries exceeding the waiver amount. 208 [Vol. 23 If the limitation on state liability coupled with complete immunity for the state official is allowed to stand, how will this affect the Ritchie doctrine, especially those areas where under Ritchie, liability for violations of the state constitution exceeded that for violations of the federal constitution? The first question that needs to be answered is which claims for damages for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights would be considered tort actions, subject to the limitations of the Maryland Tort Claims Act.2 09 Some claims, such as claims for excessive force or for illegal . search and seizure, would clearly be viewed as torts. Other claims, such as the failure to pay some public benefits due to an unconstitutional regulation, are not normally thought of as torts. A 'broad definition of torts, however, would encompass all violations of constitutional rights that resulted in harm to the plaintiffs. Black's Law Dictionary defines a tort as a violation of a duty owing to the plaintiff, as long as that duty is imposed by law rather than by agreement of the parties, or a contract. 2lO Because all suits brought for violation of constitutional rights involve a violation of a duty imposed by law, they would fall within the definition of a tort. The court in Ritchie seems to assume that the claims in that case, employment sex discrimination, would fall within the definition of the State Act. 211 If the limitations of the State Act stand, the greatest impact will be on official capacity suits against state officials, where the harm is directly caused by implementation of an unconstitutional state policy. Under federal law, such claims are not allowed. 212 Under Ritchie, they are allowed without limitation.
213 If the present limitation of the State Act stands, such suits would be limited to $50,000.
214
This is still a better result than under federal law, but would present a barrier to very large claims. 215 The limitations of the State Act will have no effect on the most egregious violations by state officials, those involving claims where the official has acted with actual malice. In such cases, no immunity some state liability, it could substitute something less than full liability for all damages, The court of appeals has approved a damage cap of $350,000 for non-economic losses in medical malpractice cases, Murphy v, Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992 Although recovery under Section 1983 may also be allowed in some cases, recovery under state law may be important, because it may not always be allowed under federal law, due to the official's qualified immunity. Qualified immunity under federal law is no longer determined by whether the official acted in good faith or bad faith-malice. Even if the official acted maliciously, he or she is protected by the immunity unless the constitutional right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the actions.219 Therefore, in a situation where a plaintiff is injured by the malicious actions of a government official whose conduct is a violation of a constitutional right that was not clearly established until after those actions, the plaintiff could recover under state, but not federal law.
The Ritchie doctrine, even if subject to the limits of the State Act, will also prove helpful to some plaintiffs injured by the nonmalicious, individual actions of state officials. This results from the fact that state law does not recognize the qualified immunity granted to public officials in individual capacity actions under Section 1983.220 The impact of state law in such situations might arguably be greater than in those involving malicious action as discussed above. This is because even though federal immunity is not based on whether the defendant acted maliciously or not, it is more likely that a defendant who acted maliciously would have violated a settled constitutional right than one who acted in good faith.221 Therefore, the good faith 216. The State Act requires that the employee act "in good faith" and "not in a reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent manner" to receive the immunity. 
B. Application to Local Government Officials
The court in Ritchie assumed for the purpose of deciding the case, that the defendant county sheriff was a state employee rather than a local government employee. 222 While recognizing the distinction under federal law between state and local officials,223 the court did not make such a distinction in the section of the opinion dealing with suits under the Maryland Constitution. 224
The court referred to the liability of public officials 225 and government officials,226 not to state or local officials. There is nothing, in either the language or the reasoning of the opinion, that would limit its reach to state officials and not include local officials. Therefore, the holding that state officials would be liable in damages for violations of the state constitution 227 would seem to apply to local government officials as well.
However, the footnote recognizing the power of the legislature to substitute government for individual liability, through a tort claims act, would also seem applicable. 228 There is a Local Government Tort Claims Act 229 (hereinafter the Local Act) which is similar, but not identical, to the State Act. 230 As mentioned previously, the result of the State Act is to hold the individual liable for acts that were malicious or outside of the scope of employment, and to hold the state liable, up to a limit of $50,000, for non-malicious actions taken within the scope of employment.
231
Because of differences in language and structure, the Local Act may not reach the same result. The Local Act holds local governments liable, up to a limit of $200,000 per individual claim and $500,000 per occurrence, "for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with the local government. "232 This Another section of the Local Act provides that "a person may 1,10t execute [a judgment] against an employee" for acts within the scope of employment unless the employee acted with actual malice.235 It is important to note that the prohibition is against "executing" rather than obtaining the judgment.
The most reasonable interpretation of these sections when read together is that local government officials could be sued for all constitutional violations. If the official did not act with malice, the judgment could not be enforced against him or her personally, and only the government would be liable, up to the damage limitation. If the official acted with malice, the judgment could be enforced against the government, with a right of indemnification against the official,236 or against the official personally. 237 This reading would make the results very similar to the results in a suit under the State Act, with the following differences: Under the State Act, if the official acted maliciously, only the official would be liable.238 Under the Local Act, if the official acted maliciously, both the official and the government would be liable, but the government could sue the official for indemnification. 239 Under both acts, if the official did not act maliciously, only the government would be liable. 240 The difference in non-malicious actions would only be the amount of liability, which is considerably higher under the Local Act. 241 This result is complicated, however, by another statute that was passed in 1990 issues of governmental immunities, provides that "[a]n official of a municipal corporation, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official's employment or authority shall be immune as an official or individual from any civil liability for the performance of the action. "243 Unlike the provision of the Local Act, which is merely a prohibition against executing a judgment against the official personally,244 this provision holds the official "immune"-presumably meaning that no judgment could be entered against the official.2 45 This in turn would also destroy the government's derivative liability, since it is only liable "to the extent that a judgment could have been rendered" against the employee. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the passage of the 1990 immunity statute was meant to have the effect of removing not only individual, but also governmental immunity under the Local Act. Given this interpretation, this section greatly reduces the coverage of the Local Act. There would be no liability, either personal or governmental, for any constitutional violations committed while an official was acting in good faith. This, of course, runs counter to the reasoning of Ritchie.
The only governmental liability allowed under the Local Act would occur if the official acted with malice, when he or she would have been liable anyway. The only positive effect of the Local Act for victims, therefore, would be to provide an alternative deep pocket defendant for constitutional violations that had been committed with malice.
A more sensible reading of the 1990 immunity clause would be that it was enacted to make certain that public officials could not be held personally liable for non-malicious actions. If the legislature had intended to remove governmental liability as well as personal liability, it is likely that they would have made this clear, rather than relying on the fact that immunizing the official would also immunize the government.
If the restrictive reading of the Davis court prevails, it will make recovery for violations of the state constitution committed by local officials more difficult. It must be remembered, however, that unlike the situation with state officials, recompense may already be had under Section 1983 for violations of federal law committed by local officials acting in their official capacity. If the local official was acting pursuant to official government policy, suit may be brought against the government itself. 249 Additionally, if the local official was acting in an individual capacity, suit could be maintained under Section 1983 if the right in question had previously been clearly established. 250 Also, if the official had acted with malice, suit could be maintained under the Local Act. 251 The only gap in liability would occur where the official had acted in an individual capacity, not pursuant to government policy, but without malice, and had violated a right which had not been clearly established at the time of the harm. In this case, under the reasoning of the court of special appeals, neither the official nor the government would be liable. It might be unfair to hold the official liable in such circumstances, but it might be appropriate to provide for government liability. This is the result under the State Act, and was the result under the Local Act, absent the 1990 immunity statute.
VI. FILING IN STATE VERSUS FEDERAL COURT
A plaintiff who wishes to assert both federal and state constitutional claims faces the choice of whether to file suit in state or federal court. State claims may be asserted in federal court through the doctrine of pendent, or supplemental jurisdiction. 252 This doctrine allows plaintiffs to bring state claims into federal court as long as they are so related to the federal claims "that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. " Where liability under both state and federal law is identical, the situation is relatively straightforward. For example, consider the situation of a state police officer who, savagely and without cause, beats a suspect taken into custody. In this situation, the officer has clearly violated the settled constitutional rights of the plaintiff under both the federal and state constitutions. Also, under both Section 1983 holdings and the Ritchie opinion, the officer would be liable for the damages personally. 257
In such a case, the plaintiff could file both claims in federal court. 258 The plaintiff could also file both claims in state court, but in that case the defendant could have the case removed to federal court if he or she desired. 259 If the plaintiff preferred to have the case heard in state court, he or she would have to forgo the federal claims and pursue only the state claims. That would also mean forgoing the possibility of receiving an award of attorney's fees, which may accompany a successful Section 1983 claim.260
The results are also quite straightforward when a plaintiff wishes to assert a claim allowable under Ritchie that would not be allowable under Section 1983-for example, a complaint against a state official acting in his or her official capacity. Such a case could be brought only in state court. .
The choice becomes somewhat more problematic in a situation where the plaintiff's federal law claim might be barred by the defendant's qualified immunity. It is not always clear at the outset of the litigation whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been "clearly established" enough to avoid the immunity. In this type of case, the defendant will likely move for summary judgment on the federal claims relying on immunity grounds. Federal courts have been instructed to deal with this defense by motion for summary judgment before triaP61 If summary judgment is granted as to the federal claims, the court has discretion to dismiss the supplementary state claims, and will in most instances do SO.262 The plaintiff would then have to refile the state claims in state court. Although this is a procedural inconvenience, it will not be fatal to the plaintiff's claims since the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute has a provision that tolls the statute of limitations for pendant state claims dismissed by the federal court. 263 if the plaintiff wished to avoid the possibility of the inconvenience of refiling in state court, he or she could file both federal and state claims in state court. This may not work, however, since the defendant could first remove the entire case to federal court, then move for summary judgment on the federal claim, then have the state claim dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This would force the plaintiff to refile the state claims back in state court where he or she had started some months before.
The bottom line is that the Ritchie holding, insofar as it extends liability beyond that provided by federal law, will be applied, in the main, by state, not federal courts. enjoy the same absolute immunity from damages for state constitutional claims as they do from federal claims. Ritchie involved a sheriff exercising executive functions, who under federal law would have received only qualified immunity. 264 The Ritchie opinion makes clear that such a qualified immunity defense is not available under state law against a state constitutional claim. 265 Both the reasoning of the opinion and, at one point, even the language would seem to apply to absolute immunities as well. 266 If that were the case, then plaintiffs could sue judges and prosecutors for constitutional violations, which they have never been able to do under federal law. This would have been a somewhat surprising result given the firm entrenchment of such immunities.
VII. EFFECT ON ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
In its most recent opinion on the subject, however, the court of appeals has made clear that absolute judicial immunity remains firm, even against claims brought under the Maryland Constitution. 267 In Parker v. State,268 the plaintiff brought suit against a circuit court judge who mistakenly issued an arrest warrant for her on charges for which she had already been acquitted, without checking the case file or docket entries .269 She brought a Section 1983 claim against the judge and a claim against the state under the State Tort Claims Act, alleging false imprisonment, false arrest, and negligence on the part of the judge.27°
In discussing the state's liability for the Torts Act claim, the court first noted that all parties agreed that since liability under the Tort Claims Act was derivative, if Judge Brown was entitled to absolute judicial immunity, then the state would not be liable under the Act. 271 The court also noted that plairitiff had asserted only nonconstitutional state law torts and had not specifically asserted The court reviewed the doctrine of judicial immunity under English common law, federal law, and Maryland law, and found that it had been firmly established since 1607.274 It held that under Maryland law, judges were absolutely immune from civil liability for their judicial acts. 275 The court specifically distinguished qualified public official immunity, which was not available against claims for intentional torts or for violations of the Maryland Constitution, from absolute judicial immunity, which applied broadly to all civil claims for damages. 276 The holding in Parker leaves plaintiffs who have been injured by the unconstitutional actions of judges without a civil damage remedy under either federal or state law. This result is not surprising, and, in fact, a contrary result would have been quite revolutionary. Although the court's opinion addresses only absolute judicial immunity and not absolute prosecutorial or legislative immunity, there In distinguishing the qualified immunity of public officials from absolute judicial immunity, the court stated:
Id.
Unlike other public officials, judges are required, on a daily basis, to make numerous decisions in disputes between adverse parties. With respect to each judicial decision, there is a winner and a loser. Furthermore, what is won or lost often has great value to the litigants: the custody of children, compensation for serious injuries, freedom from physical restraint, or simply large sums of money. With such important issues at stake in an adversarial context, absolute immunity is needed to forestall endless collateral attacks on judgments through civil actions against the judges themselves.
